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Abstract 
This article aims to explain the hitherto unexplored role of General Average and oth-
er forms of maritime averages in risk management in sixteenth-century Antwerp. 
Whereas most scholarly attention has focused on insurance, this article makes the 
case that maritime averages also were an important tool to manage risk. The article 
highlights four major developments: first, concrete causes were incorporated under 
the General Average principle to cover uninsurable expenses and protection costs; 
second, General Average payments could be recovered via insurance; third, indi-
vidual merchants sought to assess risk more precisely, developing new varieties of 
maritime averages themselves; and fourth, the protective foreign merchant guilds 
developed compulsory contributions based on General Average. The article also 
adds to related discussions on mercantile conflict resolution and commercial law.
Introduction
In 1575, a Spanish ship sailing from Spain to Antwerp encountered a 
storm and jettisoned some sacks wool off the coast of Dover, England.2 
The ship, heavily damaged, subsequently had to be repaired. The mas-
1	  This paper was written with the financial support of the European Research Council under Grant 
Agreement 724544 (AveTransRisk). The author thanks Maria Fusaro, Dave De ruysscher, Sabine Go and 
the participants of the HOST seminar at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, as well as to the two anonymous 
peer reviewers, for constructive and detailed feedback. The author extends special gratefulness to Lewis 
Wade for commenting, proofreading and editing various versions of this paper.
2	  Municipal Archives of Antwerp (hereafter SAA), Judgement Books, V1255, fol. 221v-225r.
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ter hired pilots to enter the port of Dieppe (Normandy), but due to 
bad weather and their incompetence, the ship incurred further dam-
ages and more wool had to be jettisoned. After repairs were complet-
ed, the venture continued to Ostend where the damages were assessed. 
The costs of the jettisoned goods were to be shared by all participants 
in the voyage, through a procedure known as General Average, where-
by extraordinary costs to save the venture were shared among all those 
involved. This was a common procedure in early modern Europe, but 
complications soon arose. Since the wool was insured, those liable to 
pay for General Average tried to have their insurers pay for the contri-
bution. The insurers of the wool, in protest, started litigation proce-
dures at the Antwerp municipal court. They agreed to pay for the wool 
jettisoned before the coast of England, but not for the additional losses 
that were incurred in Normandy, nor for the pilotage costs.3 The pro-
tests were only partially successful because the Antwerp judges decid-
ed that costs for the reparations and pilotage would have to be paid by 
the ship-owner and master as a result of their negligence.4 The insurers 
were, however, obligated to reimburse the costs for all the jettisoned 
wool. 
This episode shows that risk management was a complex business 
in sixteenth-century Antwerp. Merchants faced formidable obstacles 
such as frequent war and natural hazards. For maritime trade, addition-
al problems also included the threat of hijacking and shipwreck.5 Mer-
chants were nevertheless able to develop various techniques to deal 
with maritime risks. Most scholars have focused on the ‘rise’ of marine 
insurance, while the development and use of other instruments such 
as General Average has been virtually neglected in the literature on risk 
management. Both Frank Knight and Douglass North – eminent schol-
ars who have worked extensively on risk management – identified in-
surance as a major innovation that enabled merchants to distinguish 
between uncertainty and risk, the latter being a quantifiable and fore-
seeable form of uncertainty.6 While this is undoubtedly true, a singular 
focus on insurance obscures the complexity of risk management.7 Gen-
3	  Ibidem, fol. 223r-224v.
4	  Ibidem, fol. 225r.
5	  All these hazards are analysed in: Revue d’Histoire Maritime (RHM) (2008), monographic issue 9: 
‘Risque, sécurité et sécurisation maritimes depuis le Moyen Âge’.
6	  D.C. North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance (Cambridge 1990) 126; F.C. 
Knight, Risk, uncertainty, and profit (Boston/New York 1921) 247-253.
7	  Such a view can be found in: P. Mathias, ‘Strategies for reducing risk by entrepreneurs in the ear-
ly modern period’, in: C. Lesger and L. Noordegraaf (eds.), Entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship in early 
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eral Average – an extra-contractual and equitable instrument with roots 
in Roman law – played an important role in risk management alongside 
other methods such as cargo spreading.8 Given the attention that many 
jurists writing on maritime law during the early modern period gave to 
General Average, it should also be more prominent in the study of risk 
management by contemporary scholars, acknowledging that the tools 
existed simultaneously and countered different kinds of risk.9 
Guido Rossi has recently pointed out that a historical understand-
ing of General Average is also important to understand the develop-
ment of insurance because the two tools complemented each other.10 
Yet no studies exist that explain the role of General Average and other 
varieties of maritime averages which were developed during the six-
teenth century.11 This is surprising, as merchants actively used and 
improved the instrument to account for losses and expenses, such 
as artillery and convoy costs, that insurance did not cover for legal, 
practical or historical reasons. Even today insurance cannot cover 
every risk. As a result, General Average still exists under the so-called 
York-Antwerp Rules (YAR), first codified in 1890 to protect shipmas-
ters and -owners from damages that insurers cannot or do not wish to 
cover, even if calls for the abolition of General Average have become 
louder in recent years.12 Current-day discussions on the usefulness of 
General Average, however, obscure the (historical) reality that the in-
modern times. Merchants and industrialists within the orbit of the Dutch staple market (The Hague 1995) 
5-24, 22-23.
8	  J.P. Van Niekerk, The development of the principles of insurance law in the Netherlands from 1500 to 
1800 (two volumes) (Hilversum 1998) 4-7; H. Van der Wee, The growth of the Antwerp market and the 
European economy, fourteenth-sixteenth centuries (vol. 2) (The Hague 1963) 327-328; C.A. Davids, ‘Ze-
kerheidsregelingen in de scheepvaart en het landtransport, 1500-1800’, in: J. Van Gerwen and M.H.D. 
Van Leeuwen (eds.), Studies over zekerheidsarrangementen. Risico’s, risicobestrijding en verzekeringen in 
Nederland vanaf de Middeleeuwen (Amsterdam/The Hague 1998) 183-202, 184-188.
9	  The standard sixteenth-century work on General Average in the Low Countries is: Q. Weytsen, Een 
Tractaet van Avarien (Harlingen 1646). See on Weytsen: G.P. Dreijer and O. Vervaart, ‘Quintin Weytsen’, 
Pro Memorie 21:2 (2019) 38-41.
10  G. Rossi, Insurance in Elizabethan England: the London Code (Cambridge 2016) 137-140.
11  One exception is: D. Heirbaut and D. De ruysscher, ‘Belgium’, in: P. Hellwege (ed.), Comparative his-
tory of insurance law in Europe. A research agenda (Berlin 2018) 89-132, 114. For the medieval laws on 
jettison, see: E. Frankot, ‘Of laws of ships and shipmen’. Medieval maritime law and its practice in urban 
Northern Europe (Edinburgh 2012).
12  For critical voices on General Average see: K.S. Selmer, The survival of General Average. A necessi-
ty of an anachronism? (Oslo 1958); P.K. Mukherjee, ‘The anachronism in maritime law that is general 
average’, WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 4:2 (2005) 195-209. See for the YAR: R.H. Cornah, ‘The road 
to Vancouver – the development of the York-Antwerp Rules’, Journal of International Maritime Law 10 
(2004) 155-166.
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strument was widely used during the medieval and early modern pe-
riod and still is so today. Sixteenth-century discussions were primari-
ly focused on jurisdictional issues.13 This article studies how General 
Average, and other types of ‘maritime averages’ in sixteenth-century 
Antwerp were used in the context of risk management. Starting from 
this it then makes four contributions to the literature: first, it explains 
the role of General Average in relation to insurance, challenging the 
idea of insurance as the most important tool of risk management; sec-
ond, it shows how merchants improved and combined more tradi-
tional risk management tools to face new challenges;14 third, it adds 
to current discussions on mercantile conflict resolution, showing the 
importance of public-order institutions in this context; fourth, it con-
tributes to debates on the development of commercial law and the 
governance thereof by explaining the complex interplay between var-
ious sources of law, challenging linear narratives such as those of the 
lex mercatoria.15
As Sheilagh Ogilvie has noted, institutions (the structures of rules 
and norms governing economic transactions) often performed mul-
tiple functions at the same time and were often organized by certain 
powerful groups, such as foreign merchant guilds (so-called nationes), 
influencing distributional effects between and within groups.16 In Ant-
werp and its Flemish counterpart Bruges, Southern European nationes 
kept strict control over the distribution of risk and developed sever-
al varieties of maritime averages to cover different kinds of risk. This 
was no surprise since the Iberian nationes possessed civil jurisdiction 
over General Average regarding their own members, a privilege which 
they of course defended. The Iberian ones were also allowed to levy 
a compulsory contribution (the droit d’avarie) on their members to 
cover convoy costs, legal fees and other expenses incurred by the na-
tio.17 Etymologically similar to General Average, it was used to cover 
13  A ‘historical’ defence of General Average can be found in: J.A. Kruit, ‘General average – general prin-
ciple plus varying practical application equals uniformity?’, Journal of International Maritime Law 21 
(2015) 190-202.
14  E.S. Hunt and J.M. Murray, A history of business in medieval Europe, 1200-1550 (Cambridge 1999) 
178-179, 249.
15  See for these questions in Bruges, Antwerp and Amsterdam: O.C. Gelderblom, Cities of commerce 
– The institutional foundations of international trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650 (Princeton 2013) 
102-140, especially 133-139.
16  S. Ogilvie, ‘ “Whatever is, is right?” Economic institutions in pre-industrial Europe’, Economic His-
tory Review 60:4 (2007) 649-684, 662-665 and 668-671, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0289.2007. 
00408.x; Idem, Institutions and European trade. Merchant guilds, 1000-1800 (Cambridge 2011) 94-159. 
17  On nationes in Bruges and Antwerp see: B. Blondé, O. Gelderblom and P. Stabel, ‘Foreign merchant 
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the communal expenses of the natio.18 This fits Ogilvie’s interpreta-
tion of institutions since the natio was able to use its bargaining pow-
er and privileges to force individual merchants to pay to cover mutu-
al expenses, adapting institutions to serve multiple needs.19 A cynical 
view might state this that the nationes used this instrument for their 
own interests, even if maritime averages also functioned as an equita-
ble and useful tool to cover mutual expenses such as convoy costs and 
other protection costs.20 General Average was an equitable non-market 
tool not prone to speculation, whereas insurance in contrast could in-
duce moral hazard and encourage fraudulent behaviour.21 Since Gen-
eral Average actively influenced the distribution of risk, it can also be 
viewed through the lens of Ogilvie’s conceptualization of institutions. 
The insurers’ liability for General Average costs after the jettison of in-
sured goods is further evidence that the instrument was adapted to 
make sure nobody could opt out of the risk community of maritime 
ventures.22
This article follows Knight’s famous distinction as ‘measurable un-
certainty’, clearly distinguishing between uncertainty (unknown prob-
abilities) and risk (known probabilities), even if actuarial calculations 
of risk were still hard to make during the sixteenth century.23 Six-
teenth-century Antwerp offers a compelling case to study the develop-
ment of General Average and other maritime averages. It was the ma-
jor commercial city in north-western Europe during this period, with 
Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, German and English merchants active in 
the city, alongside local merchants rising to prominence during the sec-
communities in Bruges, Antwerp and Amsterdam’, in: D. Calabi and S.T. Christensen (eds.), Cultural ex-
change in early modern Europe. Volume 2: Cities and cultural exchange in Europe, 1400-1700 (Cambridge 
2013) 154-174.
18  L. Gilliodts-Van Severen, Cartulaire de l’ancien consulat d’Espagne à Bruges. Recueil de documents 
concernant le commerce maritime et intérieur, le droit des gens public et privé, et l’histoire économique de 
la Flandre (Bruges 1901-1902) 594-595.
19  Ogilvie, ‘ “Whatever is, is right?” ’, 681.
20  For the concept of protection costs: F.C. Lane, Profits from power. Readings in protection costs and vi-
olence-controlling enterprises (New York 1979). 
21  Knight, Risk, uncertainty, and profit, 251. For Antwerp, see: D. De ruysscher, ‘Antwerp 1490-1590. In-
surance and speculation’, in: A.P. Leonard (ed.), Marine insurance. Origins and institutions (Basingstoke 
2016) 79-105, 96. 
22  Van Niekerk, The development, 76-80.
23  Knight, Risk, uncertainty, and profit, 247-253; G. Ceccarelli, ‘The price for risk-taking. Marine insur-
ance and probability calculus in the Late Middle Ages’, Electronic Journal for History of Probability and 
Statistics 3:1 (2007) 1-26.
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ond half of the century.24 The development of financial markets in Bru-
ges and Antwerp between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries co-
incided with the coming-of-age of insurance as a security instrument 
for maritime trade, creating a sophisticated and speculative insurance 
market during the sixteenth century.25 Insurance has loomed large in 
debates about risk management in the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries since Violet Barbour and Florence Edler-De Roover placed the de-
velopment of insurance in a European perspective.26 It was introduced 
to the Low Countries by Italian merchants in Bruges, who invented it 
during the High Middle Ages, with the first known insurance policy dat-
ing from 1343 in Genoa.27 Castilian merchants quickly adopted it and 
later became the main players in the insurance business in Bruges and 
Antwerp.28 Insurance quickly became more popular than older instru-
ments such as the sea loan, because it did not require an investment up-
front by the lender-insurer, whereas in the sea loan he assumed the risk 
by providing his own money to the merchant or master.29 Another inno-
vation – the bottomry loan – largely replaced the sea loan because the 
24  J. Puttevils, Merchants and trading in the sixteenth century. The golden age of Antwerp (London 2015) 
19-48. 
25  J. Materné, ‘ “Schoon ende bequaem tot versamelinge der cooplieden”. Antwerpens beurswereld tij-
dens de gouden zestiende eeuw’, in: G. Le Clercq (ed.), Ter Beurze. Geschiedenis van de aandelenhandel in 
België, 1300-1900 (Bruges/Antwerp 1992) 51-85; J. Puttevils and M. Deloof, ‘Marketing and pricing risk 
in marine insurance in sixteenth-century Antwerp’, The Journal of Economic History 77:3 (2017) 796-
837, 830-831, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050717000687. 
26  V. Barbour, ‘Marine risks and insurance in the seventeenth century’, Journal of Economic and Busi-
ness History 1:4 (1928-1929) 561-596; F. Edler-De Roover, ‘Early examples of marine insurance’, Journal 
of Economic History 5:2 (1945) 172-200.
27  L. Piccinno, ‘Genoa 1340-1620: Early development of marine insurance’, in: Leonard, Marine insur-
ance, 25-46, 31. 
28  J.A. Goris, Étude sur les colonies marchandes méridionales (Portugais, Espagnols, Italiens) à Anvers 
de 1488 à 1567 (Louvain 1925) 171-180; See for the development of insurance in Antwerp: Ibidem, 
180-193; Van Niekerk, The development; W. Brulez, De firma Della Faille en de internationale handel 
van Vlaamse firma’s in de zestiende eeuw (Brussels 1959) 156-157 and 528-529; De ruysscher, ‘Ant-
werp 1490-1590’, 79-105; Idem, ‘Van kade naar stadhuis. Informatieuitwisseling, fraudebestrijding 
en gereglementeerde innovatie in Antwerpse zeeverzekeringen (ca. 1550-ca. 1700)’, Tijdschrift voor 
Geschiedenis 125:3 (2012) 366-383, https://doi.org/10.5117/TVGESCH2012.3.RUYS; C. Wijffels, ‘Een 
Antwerpse zeeverzekeringspolis uit het jaar 1557’, Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor 
Geschiedenis 63:1-2 (1948) 95-103; C.H. Reatz, ‘Ordonnances du duc d’Albe sur les assurances mari-
times de 1569, 1570, 1571, avec un précis de l’histoire du droit d’assurance maritime dans les Pays-Bas’, 
Compte-rendu des séances de la commission royale d’histoire, Deuxième Série, 5 (1878) 41-118 ; L. Cou-
vreur, ‘Recht en zeeverzekeringspraktijk in de 17e en 18e eeuwen’, Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 
16:2 (1939) 184-214; H.L.V. De Groote, De zeeassurantie te Antwerpen en te Brugge in de zestiende eeuw 
(Antwerp 1975).
29  Van Niekerk, The development, 16-21.
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shipmaster would pledge the ship as collateral, diminishing the risk for 
the lender.30
Since quantitative data are largely unavailable, the article primarily 
relies on qualitative, legal sources, which also informs us on the prac-
tical mercantile development of maritime averages: legislation by the 
Habsburg rulers, collections of customary law of Antwerp and the Cas-
tilian natio, as well as the important 1564 legal treatise by Quintin Weyt-
sen; a selection of some twenty-five court cases on General Average 
from the Antwerp municipal court for the period 1545-158231; freight 
contracts from three Antwerp notaries that deal extensively with mari-
time averages for the period 1525-156032; and eight cases from the Cas-
tilian consular court in Bruges from the period 1545-1560.33 The article 
is divided into four further sections. The next section concerns the de-
velopment of General Average and its role in risk management in Ant-
werp during the sixteenth century. The article subsequently analyses 
the relationship between insurance and General Average, before two 
concluding sections look at the emergence of other maritime averages.
General Average in the sixteenth-century Southern Low 
Countries
The concept of mutual contribution after a deliberate loss was already 
enshrined in Roman law, legally creating a closed risk community for 
a venture.34 It also existed in medieval Islamic maritime law, on which 
the name is based (from ‘awar’, meaning damage in Arabic).35 Simi-
30  Ibidem.
31  See the following cases: SAA, Judgement Books, V1241, fol. 283r-v; V1242, fol. 127r; V1244, fol. 
128r-130r; V1245, fol. 120r-121r , 174r-v; V1246, fol. 62r-v; V1247, fol. 82v-84v, 148r-151r, 269r-v; 
V1249, fol. 1r-v, 6v-7v, 130r, 204r-205r; V1250, fol. 139r, 150v-151r, 241r-v; V1251, fol. 45v-46v, 71v-72r, 
104r-v; V1252, fol. 78r-v, 168r-v; V1254, fol. 107r-v, 147v-148v; V1255, fol. 221v-225r; V1256, fol. 
58v-59v.
32  SAA, Notariaat Streyt, inv. N#1232 and N#1233; Notariaat ’s-Hertoghen, inv. N#2070-N#2078; Rijks-
archief Antwerpen (hereafter RAA), inv. R02, Notariaat De Platea, I, fol. 63r-64r.
33  Municipal Archives of Bruges (hereafter SAB), Old Archive, Spanish Nation, inv. 304, V.A., Libro de 
pleytos ordinarios, fol. 104v, 105v, 107r-v, 108r-v, 115r-v, 145r, 195r-v, 199r. The Castilian natio remained 
in Bruges throughout the sixteenth century as opposed to most other nationes. See: J. Maréchal, ‘Le de-
part de Bruges des marchands étrangers (XVe et XVIe siècle)’, Handelingen voor het Gemootschap ‘Société 
d’Émulation’ te Brugge 88 (2005) 26-74, 45-54.
34  D.J. Wilson and J.H.S. Cooke, Lowndes and Rudolf, The Law of General Average and the York-Antwerp 
Rules (London 1990) 1-5.
35  H.S. Khalilieh, Islamic maritime law: an introduction (Leiden/Boston 1998) 87-104. 
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lar procedures were later outlined in three influential collections of 
maritime law in late-medieval Europe (the Rôles d’Oléron, the Conso-
lat del Mar and the Wisby Laws).36 However, the principle was only 
termed ‘General Average’ (groote avarye) in the 1551 Ordonnance is-
sued by Charles V.37 In the subsequent 1563 Ordonnance (issued by 
Philip II), a whole chapter on General Average was included.38 In the 
sixteenth-century Low Countries, several types of maritime aver ages 
developed. First, there was of course General Average (averij-grosse 
in Dutch). During the sixteenth century, the procedure and admissi-
ble acts were clarified in formal law, primarily in the Ordonnances of 
the Habsburg rulers, while the principle (deliberate loss for the com-
mon benefit) did not change. Examples of causes for General Average 
were the jettisoning of goods, mast cutting and voluntarily running 
aground, with those participating in the venture reimbursing those 
who had incurred losses to goods or ship. A second variety, also defined 
in the 1551 Ordonnance, was Small Average (also Common Average, 
averij-commune) a contribution often included in the freight money, 
made for foreseeable costs such as port duties and pilotage. A third cat-
egory was Particular Average (kleine averij or averij-simpel), which was 
declared when the loss was accidental. The owner of the cargo would 
bear the loss themselves in such cases unless the master behaved negli-
gently.39 This category was only defined in the 1608 Costuymen of Ant-
werp. Johan van Niekerk also noted a fourth category, Contractual Av-
erage (contractuele averij), whereby merchants used freight contracts 
to share potential expenses resulting from both Particular Average and 
Small Average.40 In practice, merchants often used these varieties in 
combination to address different kinds of risks depending on the cir-
cumstances.
New forms of maritime averages originating from the Iberian Penin-
sula, taking the form of a compulsory contribution, were during the late 
fifteenth century introduced by Castilian merchants in the Low Coun-
tries, often based on varieties developed by Consulados (merchant or-
ganizations) in the Iberian Peninsula.41 One was the droit d’avarie (also 
36  G. Landwehr, Die Haverei in den mittelalterlichten deutschen Seerechtsquellen (Hamburg 1985) 4-7. 
37  Kruit, ‘General average’, 198-199.
38  The full text of the Ordonnance (hereafter named 1563 Ordonnance) is in: J-M. Pardessus (ed.), Col-
lection de lois, maritimes antérieures au XVIIIe siècle (vol. 4) (Paris 1828) 64-102, there Chapter IV.
39  For an overview of the liability of the shipmaster see: G. Rossi, ‘The liability of the shipmaster in ear-
ly modern law. Comparative (and practice-oriented) remarks’, Historia et Ius 12 (2017) paper 12, 1-47.
40  Van Niekerk, The development, 64.
41  C.H. Haring, Trade and navigation between Spain and the Indies in the time of the Hapsburgs (Cam-
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avería de naçion), the compulsory contribution paid by all members of 
the natio to cover expenses of the natio. This was a privilege received by 
the nationes from foreign rulers, regional rulers and municipalities like 
Bruges and Antwerp. The second, established by the Castilian natio in 
Bruges, was known as the flete y averías (‘freight and average’), another 
compulsory contribution paid before a voyage back to the Iberian Pen-
insula to cover protection costs, such as convoy ships and artillery. It 
was calculated as a percentage of the share of goods a merchant had in 
a venture and paid to the comptroller-general (controlador) of the na-
tio who functioned as the bookkeeper of the natio.42 He was based in 
Zealand, where most Castilian ships arrived from and left for the Iberi-
an Peninsula.43 The remainder of the revenue after paying the protec-
tion costs was given to the shipmaster, who could use the money to 
cover various Small Average expenses. The flete y averías was similar 
to the better-known Spanish avería, a tax paid by merchants trading to 
the New World to cover convoy expenses.44 These innovations – con-
tributing significantly to the ‘mutualization’ of risk by Spanish mer-
chants during this period – were used to equally share common ex-
penses.45 At the same time, the compulsory contribution also raised 
transaction costs, often leading to complaints by individual merchants. 
The ability to raise these compulsory contributions were important 
privileges for the nationes and thus strongly enforced by consuls. 
The principle of deliberate loss for the common benefit from Roman 
law remained unchanged, but the number of concrete causes increased 
during the sixteenth century. Jettison (werpen) during a storm was the 
most common act after which a contribution by everyone involved in 
the venture would be required.46 In the Southern Low Countries, mast 
or rope cutting (kerven) and voluntarily running aground (strangen) to 
save a voyage were also accepted as just motives for General Average.47 
bridge (MA) 1918) 51-83 and 327-328; R.S. Smith, The Spanish guild merchant. A history of the Consula-
do, 1250-1700 (Durham (NC) 1940) 87-90.
42  R. Fagel, De Hispano-Vlaamse wereld. De contacten tussen Spanjaarden en Nederlanders 1496-1555 
(Nijmegen 1996) 138-149 and 484.
43  R. Degryse, ‘Brugge en de pilotage van de Spaanse vloot in het Zwin in de XVIde eeuw’, Handelingen 
voor het Genootschap voor Geschiedenis 67:1-2 (1980) 105-178 and 67:3-4 (1980) 227-288, 130-135.
44  M.L. Talavan, ‘La avería en el tráfico marítimo-mercantil indiano. Notas para su studio (siglos 
XVI-XVIII)’, Revista Complutense de Historia de América 24 (1998) 113-145; G. Céspedes del Castillo, ‘La 
avería en el comercio de Indias’, Anuario de Estudios Americanos 2 (1945) 515-698.
45  For this development see: A.M. Rivera Medina, ‘The mutualization of maritime risk in the Hispanic 
world (1400-1550)’, Unpublished paper, presented in Genoa 17 May 2019.
46  W. Ashburner, The Rhodian sea-law (Oxford 1909) ccliii. 
47  Weytsen, Een tractaet van avarien, 2-3. 
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Illustration 1 Stock exchange Antwerp in 1531 (1582-1588) by Pieter van den Borcht (source: 
Special Collections University of Antwerp, accession number tg:uapr:25). 
These developments were acknowledged both in legal practice and for-
mal law, for example when Philip II issued the 1563 Ordonnance to re-
gulate all aspects of maritime law and systematise legislation on both 
insurance and General Average. Quintin Weytsen, a lawyer at the Court 
of Holland, also wrote a famous legal treatise on General Average in 
1564. Based on the 1563 Ordonnance, he confirmed that the princi-
ple (deliberate loss to save the voyage) was commonly applied in the 
Low Countries.48 One example of the accepted cases for contribution 
concerned extraordinary pilotage, something already common in fif-
teenth-century Amsterdam.49 Normally, costs for pilotage were either 
incorporated into the freight money of the master or shared by Small 
Average. However, when a ship encountered a storm and extraordi-
nary pilotage was necessary to reach a safe port and prevent losses, 
 these expenses could be shared by means of General Average. This was 
rec ognized in both the 1563 Ordonnance and the 1608 Costuymen of 
Antwerp.50 The increased number of accepted cases for contribution 
48  Ibidem.
49  M.T. Goudsmit, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche zeerecht (The Hague 1882) 121-123. 
50  The full text of the Costuymen (hereafter named 1608 Costuymen) is in: G. De Longé (ed.), Coutumes 
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coincided with a more general (sixteenth-century) distinction between 
damages and expenses, drawn from Iberian practice, meaning that 
merchants and legal scholars recognized that expenses preventing los-
ses could also justify General Average, rather than only direct losses.51 
Although relatively uniform norms on General Average were created in 
the sixteenth-century Low Countries, differences did nonetheless exist 
between the various sources of law, for example on the insurability of 
General Average, which was allowed for in Antwerp municipal law but 
not (explicitly) in royal legislation.52
Another example concerned piracy. A precedent for using Gener-
al Average to share expenses incurred by pirate attacks existed in Ro-
man law, where ransom payment to save the venture was already rec-
ognized.53 In the 1540s and 1550s, piracy threats primarily came from 
French and Scottish pirates. The 1550 Ordonnance of Charles V prohib-
ited using insurance when sailing to the Iberian Peninsula on ships from 
the Low Countries, citing the speculative aspect of insurance.54 Charles 
followed up with another Ordonnance in 1551 which also regulated as-
pects of private law, including General Average.55 Castilian and Portu-
guese merchants – still exempted from the 1550 Ordonnance because 
this Ordonnance only concerned smaller ships than those they used – 
lobbied successfully to incorporate uninsurable costs incurred from pi-
rate attacks (e.g. damage to artillery or the funeral of dead sailors) into 
General Average in the 1551 Ordonnance.56 In sixteenth-century Ant-
werp, piracy was insurable as a ‘fortune of the sea’ (‘fortuyne vander 
zee’), but cargo or hull insurance did of course only cover certain costs 
such as lost goods or damage to the ship itself.57 This meant that non-in-
du Pays et Duché de Brabant. Quartier d’Anvers, Coutumes de la ville d’Anvers (vols. 3-4) (Brussels 1873-
1874). 1608 Costuymen, Part IV, Title VIII, Art. 122-123; 1563 Ordonnance, Title IV, Art. 9-10.
51  Van Niekerk, The development, 62. 
52  1608 Costuymen, Part IV, Title VIII, Art. 177. In the 1563 Ordonnance, Title IV on General Average 
and Title VII on insurance were still separated, without any mention of the insurability of jettisoned 
goods.
53  Ashburner, The Rhodian sea-law, ccliv.
54  L.H.J. Sicking, Neptune and the Netherlands. State, economy, and war at sea in the Renaissance (Lei-
den/Boston 2004) 249-252.
55  Ibidem, 253-256.
56  Idem, ‘Les marchands espagnols et portugais aux Pays-Bas et la navigation à l’époque de Charles 
Quint. Gestion des risques et législation’, Publications du Centre Européen d’Etudes Bourguignonnes 51 
(2011) 253-274, https://doi.org/10.1484/J.PCEEB.3.309. See for the clause in the 1551 Ordonnance: 
Kruit, ‘General Average’, 198-199. 
57  See for insurance and piracy: D. De ruysscher, ‘Naer het Romeinsch recht alsmede den stiel mercantiel’. 
Handel en recht in de Antwerpse rechtbank (16e-17e eeuw) (Kortrijk 2009) 286-287.
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surable costs were shared via General Average. The costs of the burial 
of a dead seaman after a pirate attack for example were allowed in Gen-
eral Average. The 1563 Ordonnance of Philip II also dealt with piracy. It 
copied most of the regulations of the 1551 Ordonnance but added that 
the remainder of the sailor’s wage and additional compensation for his 
widow could subsequently be brought into General Average, a rule also 
found in the 1608 Antwerp Costuymen.58 Weytsen stated that volun-
tary losses to pirates by negotiations, so to limit greater losses, could be 
shared via General Average, even if any direct damages by pirates were 
not a cause for General Average.59 Weytsen further elaborated on this 
issue, arguing that even negotiations with pirates whereby only part 
of the cargo was taken could be declared as General Average, because 
it saved the venture as a whole.60 This meant that General Average be-
came one of the major mechanisms to deal with losses resulting from 
pirate attacks, covering losses and expenses that insurance could not.
Insurance and General Average
The legal and economic uses of insurance and General Average is as 
yet a largely unclarified subject of study. In sixteenth-century Antwerp, 
mercantile practice defined when General Average and insurance were 
used. Despite the wide availability of insurance, General Average was 
still widely used in sixteenth-century Antwerp for three reasons. First, 
insurance was, at least until the 1570s, largely a speculative instru-
ment, for example because policies were concluded after ships had al-
ready left Antwerp61; second, while insurance in Antwerp was relatively 
cheap, General Average was an even cheaper instrument since no up-
front payment was necessary and thus useful for some parties such as 
the shipmaster who had not yet received freight money (a sort of ‘poor 
man’s insurance’), while also providing the certainty of a closed risk 
community62; and third, some expenses or losses could simply not be 
insured, for example artillery whose insurance was prohibited by the 
1550 and 1551 Ordonnances.63
58  1563 Ordonnance, Title IV, Art. 2; 1608 Costuymen, Part IV, Title VIII, Art. 77.
59  Weytsen, Een tractaet van avarien, 6.
60  Ibidem. 
61  De ruysscher, ‘Antwerp 1490-1590’, 96.
62  Van Niekerk, The development, 74-76.
63  Sicking, Neptune and the Netherlands, 251-252. In Castile, the 1556 Ordonnance of the Seville Con-
solado (Art. 32) also prohibited this.
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The growing importance of insurance also increased the need to ac-
commodate solutions to events involving both General Average and in-
surance, primarily when insured goods were jettisoned. Unsurprisingly, 
those insured often tried to pass on the payment of their General Aver-
age contribution to the underwriters, whereas the underwriter would 
often try to pin the blame on the shipmasters’ negligence in an attempt 
to declare the General Average action void. To make sure that no one 
could opt out of the risk community, the liability of insurers to pay for 
jettisoned goods was introduced. The development towards this liabili-
ty of insurers was inspired by Iberian practice, where from at least 1538 
this was the case.64 The 1556 Seville Ordonnance also contained this 
rule.65 Even if Antwerp municipal law formally accepted this rule only 
in 1608, in legal practice it was followed from at least 1545 onwards.66 
In Bruges, legal practice had already allowed for this practice from 1464 
onwards.67 Insurers had to pay for both the remainder of the payment 
after a loss was largely covered by the other participants in the venture, 
and when the value of a good was used to determine the contribution to 
another person’s loss.68 
For sixteenth-century Antwerp, the ledgers of the important Castil-
ian insurer Juan Henriquez provide the best source on the interplay be-
tween insurance and General Average.69 In 1975, Henry De Groote es-
timated that Henriquez used 58.05 per cent of insurance premiums to 
hedge against potential General Average claims.70 Recent research by 
Jeroen Puttevils and Marc Deloof has however established that this esti-
mate may be too high (Table 1)71; from this table it follows that Henriquez 
used 14.67 per cent of the value of the premium to pay for General Aver-
age claims. Yet the liability of insurers to pay for General Average widely 
varied (Table 2). Based on the ledgers of Henriquez, which also included 
other insurers, we can conclude that around 75 per cent of General Av-
erage payments amounted to under 5 per cent of the sum insured. This 
means most payments were likely covered by the premium, or by a small 
64  Rossi, Insurance in Elizabethan England, 151-153.
65  See: Pardessus, Collection de lois (vol. 6), 76-103, Art. 36 and 44.
66  As is evident from a 1545 case. See: SAA, Judgement Books, V1241, fol. 283r-v.
67  De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 15; Gilliodts-Van Severen, Cartulaire, 83.
68  Van Niekerk, The development, 78-80.
69  H. Casado Alonso, ‘Juan Henriquez, un corredor de seguros de Amberes a mediados del Siglo XVI’, in: 
J.C. Pérez Manrique (ed.), Palabras de archivo. Homenaje a Milagros Moratinos Palomero (Burgos 2018) 
49-68.
70  De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 150. 
71  Puttevils and Deloof, ‘Marketing and pricing risk’, 824.
ISSN15721701.pinn.TSEG20202.indb   43 21-08-2020   10:49
44 VOL. 17, NO. 2, 2020
TSEG
additional payment by the insurer himself. Insurance premiums for the 
routes for the Iberian Peninsula often hovered between 5-8 per cent for 
the sixteenth century.72 This explains why there are relatively few Gen-
eral Average cases in the Antwerp municipal court archives: quite sim-
ply, it was not rewarding to go to court because costs were quite low in 
most cases. Costs could however rise enormously for insurers, as the 
near-shipwreck of a ship sailing from Bordeaux to Antwerp from May 
1563 shows. In this case, insurers had to pay for 90 per cent of the damag-
es via General Average.73 This scope for skyrocketing costs perhaps also 
explains why 25 of the 40 General Average cases from the Antwerp mu-
nicipal court concerned insurers protesting General Average payments.
Table 1 General Average claims paid by Juan Henriquez (1562-1563)
Henriquez as underwriter of marine insurance £ Fl. gr.
Marine insurance premiums 763 
Payment of General Average -112
Payment of total losses -302
Total profit 349
Source: Puttevils and Deloof, ‘Marketing and price risk’, 824.
 
Table 2 Number of General Average payments by insurers in the ledgers of Juan 
Henriquez, by percentage of insured sum (1562-1563)
Per cent of average (%) Number of GA payments
0-1% 45
1-5% 79
5-25% 28
>25% 13
Total 165
Source: Wastiels, Juan Henriquez (vols. 2-4).
One example concerns a 1566 case from the Antwerp municipal court. 
The underwriter, Jan Bopta Sisat, was summoned before the court to 
pay for damages that had befallen the ship and goods it carried of the 
master and ship-owner Nicolas Bourse.74 The court record does not 
72  De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 135-138.
73  A. Wastiels, Juan Henriquez, makelaar in zeeverzekeringen te Antwerpen (1562-1563) (Unpublished 
MA thesis, Ghent University 1967), (4 Vols.) 345.
74  SAA, Judgement Books, V1250, fol. 139r. 
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Illustration 2: Andries van Eertvelt (attributed to), Schepen in de storm (1600-1652),  (source: 
Rijksmuseum Amsterdam).
 
describe how the damages occurred, but Sisat declined to pay for the 
damages to the goods, claiming that Bourse had violated the terms of 
the insurance agreement by not taking sufficient precautions to prevent 
the loss. Pinning the losses on negligent behaviour by the shipmaster 
was a common argument for insurers to make in court. For that reason, 
Sisat declined to pay the namptissement. This was a pay-out of the dam-
ages by the insurer before going to court. As a safeguard, the party in-
sured then paid a warranty at the court until the case was decided by the 
aldermen.75 As a result of Sisat’s refusal, Bourse sought payment of the 
namptissement by court order, forcing the insurer to make up his mind 
about potential further litigation. The court allowed Bourse to claim the 
namptissement, also noting that Sisat was liable for a General Average 
payment because Bourse had followed the rules stipulated in the insur-
ance agreement and had made a deliberate loss to save the venture. 76
A case from 1567 sheds light on the problems posed to insurers by 
piracy.77 A Portuguese ship sailing from Antwerp to Lisbon was hijacked 
off the coast of France. The pirates took the ship to an unnamed French 
port before they let master and crew free. The ship, however, was severe-
ly damaged by the pirates’ attack and most cargo was taken. Subse-
quently, the master decided to abandon the ship to the insurers.78 The 
insurer paid out the agreed sum and took ownership of the ship, with 
75  De ruysscher, “Naer het Romeinsch recht”, 240-241.
76  SAA, Judgement Books, V1250, fol. 139r. 
77  Idem, V1249 fol. 6v-7v. 
78  On abandonment see: G. Rossi, ‘The abandonment to the insurers in sixteenth century insurance 
practice. Comparative remarks and (a few) methodological notes’, in: H. Pihlajamäki et al (eds.), Under-
standing the sources of early modern and modern commercial law. Courts, statutes, contracts, and legal 
scholarship (Leiden/Boston 2018) 87-118. 
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the opportunity to try and salvage the ship and/or cargo.79 This was 
common practice since Roman law and sixteenth-century Ius Commune 
protected salvage rights. At the same time, the master filed for General 
Average for the goods lost to the pirates, arguing that he had jettisoned 
some of them to sail faster and escape the pirates, even if this action 
had failed.80 This would have meant that the insurers would have to pay 
for the lost goods as per the General Average claim, while the master 
had abandoned the ship to the insurers because of the heavy dam ages 
to the ship. The insurers agreed to the abandonment but argued be-
fore the court that there was no proof that the jettison had happened to 
evade the pirates. Nor had the action been successful. The court, how-
ever, ordered that the insurers had to pay for the General Average claim, 
implying that the claim was tenable based on the oral arguments be-
cause the venture was saved despite the heavy losses. In short, Antwerp 
practice stipulated that insurance covered some General Average costs 
if only to make sure that no one could legally opt out of contributing to 
mutual losses or expenses.81 As a result, it became possible to shift the 
costs for General Average, which were only supported by all stakehold-
ers in a mutual way, to a third party (i.e. the underwriters), notwith-
standing the fact that insurers often complained at the municipal court.
Contractual Average, notaries and the governance of 
General Average
Merchants also actively developed new varieties of maritime  averages 
to deal with risk and provide funds for mutual expenses. Barring Van 
Niekerk, the literature has however not picked up this development.82 
Contractual Average was one way for merchants to conclude (poten-
tial) payments for maritime averages, primarily Particular Average and 
Small Average expenses. Evidence comes from the notarial archives of 
three Antwerp notaries for the period 1525-1560: Willem Streyt, fa-
ther and son ‘s-Hertoghen, and Jacob de Platea.83 Streyt was especially 
known to have many Iberian merchants as customers, whereas ’s-Her-
79  As stipulated in the 1608 Costuymen, see: 1608 Costuymen, Part IV, Title XI, Art. 236. For the Roman 
law of salvage: Ashburner, The Rhodian sea-law, cclxxxviii.
80  SAA, Judgement Books, V1249, fol. 7r. 
81  1608 Costuymen, Part IV, Title VIII, Art. 77.
82  Van Niekerk, The development, 64-65.
83  SAA, Notariaat Streyt, inv. N#1232 and N#1233; Notariaat ’s-Hertoghen, inv. N#2070-N#2078; RAA, 
inv. R02, Notariaat De Platea, I, fol. 63r-64r.
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toghen worked with a significant number of both German (Hanseatic 
and non-Hanseatic) and Castilian merchants.84 During the sixteenth 
century, English and Hanseatic merchants started to share Small Av-
erage costs such as port duties and foreseeable pilotage within freight 
contracts. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Amsterdam, dividing 
foreseeable expenses by means of Contractual Average was also com-
mon.85 In Antwerp, these clauses in freight contracts were often con-
cluded with the formula ‘naer den costuymen ende usancie vander 
zee’ (‘after the customs and usages of the sea’).86 However vague such 
a phrase may be, the dissemination of collections of legal compila-
tions such as the Wisby Laws may have provided merchants with a bet-
ter idea of these rules, even if those rules were not necessarily uniform 
throughout Europe.87 Although no calculation was made beforehand, 
freight contracts show that merchants actively worked to manage and 
assess risks upfront. In most instances, (foreseeable) maritime averages 
were shared ex ante in the freight contract. As Jan-Albert Goris has not-
ed, Small Average was also often shared between merchants in freight 
contracts.88 Contractual Average was used for both Particular Average 
and Small Average, or for the two instruments combined. The contracts 
also often specified the role of the shipmaster, whose negligence could 
not be a reason for contribution.89
In one example from 31 July 1525, the Antwerp-based German mer-
chant Joachim Pruner hired a ship from a ship-owner in Zierikzee (Zea-
land).90 The loan agreement stipulated that potential maritime averages 
were to be shared ‘zoe dat onder den gemeynen coopman gecostumeert 
84  Fagel, De Hispano-Vlaamse wereld, 92, 106-107; J. Strieder, Aus Antwerpener Notariatsarchiven. 
Quellen zur deutschen Wirtschaftgeschichte des 16. Jahrhunderts (Berlin 1930) XXVIII-XXXIX. 
85  The author thanks Cátia Antunes (Leiden University) for providing access to a database of Amster-
dam notarial archives, including notarial sources from the Amsterdam Municipal Archives with the fol-
lowing numbers: 1/615V; 68/59; 32/II/76; 50/39v; 81/108; 82/170. 
86  This was a common way to share maritime averages, even if it was not necessarily clear what it 
meant since mercantile custom is a thorny issue in legal history. See for this problem: E. Kadens, ‘Or-
der within law, variety within custom. The character of the medieval law merchant’, Chicago Journal of 
International Law 139 (2004) 39-65. See for records: SAA, Notariaat ’s-Hertoghen, N#2072 (1545), fol. 
70r-73r; Idem, N#2073 (1547), fol. 13r-14r; RAA, Notariaat De Platea, I, fol. 63r-64r. All these records 
can also be found in: Strieder, Aus Antwerpener Notariatsarchiven, nrs. 16, 273-276 and 357. 
87  See for example: Frankot, ‘Medieval maritime law from Oléron to Wisby. Jurisdictions in the law of 
the sea’, in: J. Pan-Montojo and F. Pedersen (eds.), Communities in European history. Representations, ju-
risdictions, conflicts (Pisa 2007), 151-172; Kruit, ‘General Average’.
88  Goris, Étude, 173. 
89  Rossi, ‘The liability of the shipmaster’, 29-33.
90  RAA, Notariaat De Platea, I, fol. 63r-64r.
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wordt’ (‘as is customary for all merchants’). Another contract from 14 
June 1535 also shows that maritime averages were shared among var-
ious Spanish merchants before a voyage.91 Since the costs of (foreseea-
ble) pilotage could be high, it was often decided that these costs would 
be split among the partners in the venture and be treated as Contrac-
tual Average, enabling merchants to assess the costs and risks upfront. 
The payment of Small Average was hence commonly incorporated in 
freight contracts. A 1545 contract concluded before Hertoghen sr. stip-
ulated that ‘gerechten oncosten van der avaryen nach usancio ende cos-
tume van der zee’ (‘lawful expenses of average after usage and customs 
of the sea’) should be paid.92 A similar 1547 freight contract offered a 
similar formula.93 The records of Streyt also contained several examples 
of clauses on maritime averages.94 In other freight contracts in Streyt’s 
ledgers, uninsurable costs such as artillery were included in a freight 
contract by Contractual Average to prevent conflict afterward.95 
Besides concluding Contractual Average, Antwerp notaries often 
heard attestations when General Average was claimed, registered the 
calculus when damages occurred and sometimes acted as average ad-
justers (dispacheurs) themselves.96 Early in 1535, Streyt for example 
drew up a General Average calculus in Castilian.97 In another case from 
26 April 1535, Streyt acted as both the average adjuster and the execu-
tor of an insurance policy.98 The ship had been arrested, which incurred 
additional costs – for example additional crew wages – and these were 
brought into General Average; in this case ’s-Hertoghen functioned as 
a witness.99 In another case from 13 October 1535, Streyt was appoint-
ed to draw up the General Average calculus after a Spanish ship had in-
curred damages off the coast of the Scilly Islands.100 The ship had broken 
into two parts but was repaired in port. The master of the ship claimed 
the costs to repair the ship via General Average. Based on the freight 
contract, which had stipulated that the maritime averages should be 
91   SAA, Notariaat Streyt, N#1232 (1535), fol. 57v-58r. 
92   Idem, Notariaat ’s-Hertoghen, N#2072 (1545), fol. 70r-73r.
93   Idem, N#2073 (1547), fol. 13r-14r.
94   See, for example: Idem, Notariaat Streyt, N#1232, fols. 56r-57v, 57v-58r, 70r, 71r-72r; N#1233, fol. 
165r-166r.
95   Ibidem, fol. 56r-57v and 71v-72r; Idem, N#1233 (1540), fol. 96v-97v. 
96   De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 22-23.
97   SAA, Notariaat Streyt, N#1232 (1535), fol. 8v-9v; Goris, Étude, 174-175.
98   Ibidem, fol. 39v-40r. 
99   Ibidem, fol. 40r.
100 Ibidem, fol. 95r-v. 
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shared according to the ‘usage and customs of the sea’, Streyt drew up 
the calculus.101 Antwerp did not actively exercise jurisdiction over Gen-
eral Average cases before the 1560s, meaning merchants often enlisted 
trusted merchants or notaries as arbiters to solve conflicts.102 Conflict 
resolution on General Average cases in Antwerp was hence largely a 
private-order matter until the 1560s, although explicitly blessed by the 
municipal government.103 From the 1560s onwards, the Antwerp alder-
men tried to gain greater leverage over General Average procedures and 
therefore started to licence specialized average adjusters and reign in 
the jurisdiction of most of the nationes (except the Portuguese), even if 
the court never became involved with the actual General Average calcu-
lations.104 In 1568, Castilian merchants in Antwerp, for example, tried 
to appoint the notary Jehan de Berlaymont as the average adjuster af-
ter a joint Portuguese-Castilian ship had incurred damages, which was 
blocked after the Portuguese consuls objected and were granted the 
right to draw up the General Average claim.105 While conflict resolution 
of General Average disputes was largely a mixture of ‘private-order’ and 
‘public-order’ solutions until the 1550s, Antwerp decidedly moved to-
wards a public-order, open-access legal system during the second half 
of the sixteenth century.106
The flete y averías and the mutualization of risk
The necessity to assess risk more precisely and cover mutual expens-
es led the Castilian consuls to develop the flete y averías gruesas y com-
mune.107 The flete y averías was a compulsory contribution paid by the 
merchants who were participating in the venture to the comptrol-
ler-general of the natio. The comptroller-general also negotiated with 
skippers’ guilds from Zealand who piloted small ships from Zealand 
101 Ibidem, fol 95v.
102 De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 143-144.
103 De ruysscher, ‘Antwerp 1490-1590’, 85-87. See for the negotiations on insurance: De ruysscher and 
Puttevils, ‘The art of compromise: legislative deliberations on marine insurance institutions in Antwerp 
(c. 1550-c. 1570), Low Countries Historical Review 130:3 (2015) 25-49, http://doi.org/10.18352/bmgn-
lchr.10102. 
104 De Groote, De zeeassurantie, 144-146; De ruysscher, “Naer het Romeinsch Recht”, 117-121. 
105 Ibidem; See also: SAA, inv. PK#640, fol. 148v-149v.
106 A similar argument can be found in: Puttevils, Merchants and trading, 139-144.
107 Rivera Medina, ‘The mutualisation of risk’. 
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to Antwerp or Bruges during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.108 
The parties made arrangements about the wages for the pilots’ services 
and the expense of maritime averages, leading to predictable expenses 
for the Castilian merchants.109 The flete y averías was calculated on the 
profits made on the sale of wool, although almost no quantitative data 
have survived.110 According to Raymond Fagel, who studied the flete y 
averías for the Burgos-Bruges trade during the early sixteenth century, it 
hovered around 4-5 per cent of the profit on the venture (see table 3).111 
What is clear is that the expenses for the flete y averías on average rose 
during the sixteenth century, from 50.5 to 76.5 dineros, a development 
largely due to better quality of the wool and higher prices.112
The flete y averías increased transaction costs prima facie, al-
though the instrument was used to cover mutual expenses such as con-
voys protecting the privately-owned ships sailing to the Iberian Pen-
insula.113 The flete y averías both covered mutual protection costs,
Table 3 Payments of flete y avérias
Year Percentage flete y averias of total profit (dineros)
1511 4,79%
1512 5,2%
1513 5,31%
1514 4,59%
Source: Fagel, De Hispano-Vlaamse wereld, 484. 
but also included foreseeable Small Average costs, such as pilotage be-
tween Zealand and Bruges and port duties. Hence, the flete y averías 
was a combination of the droit d’avarie (a ‘mutualistic’ compulsory con-
tribution levied by the Castilian natio) and Contractual Average (for it 
shared expenses of Particular Average and Small Average before a voy-
age). Since the powerful Iberian nationes strictly enforced the payment 
of the flete y averías, members of the natio had no choice but to pay the 
compulsory contribution. Merchants were of course also free to take 
out insurance for their own goods. Even though transaction costs for 
108 R.F.G.M. Zijlmans, Troebele betrekkingen. Grens, scheepvaart- en waterstaatskwesties in de Neder-
landen tot 1800 (Hilversum 2017) 275.
109 Gilliodts-Van Severen, Cartulaire, 412-415, 426-428.
110 Fagel, De Hispano-Vlaamse wereld, 50-52.
111 Ibidem, 484.
112 Ibidem, 45, note 167. One pound Great Flemish was 240 dineros. See: Ibidem, 481.
113 Van Niekerk, The development, 64-65.
ISSN15721701.pinn.TSEG20202.indb   50 21-08-2020   10:49
DREIJER
MARITIME AVERAGES AND THE COMPLEXITY OF RISK MANAGEMENT IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ANTWERP
51
individual merchants could be high, in the trade-off between higher 
transaction costs and lower risk merchants often preferred the latter. 
Castilian merchants nevertheless sometimes complained at the 
consular court in Bruges that the cost for the flete y averías was too 
high. Most cases in the consular court concerned the enforcement of 
payment by the consuls, which shows that payment was sometimes 
resisted by merchants. A 1549 case for example witnessed a group of 
merchants appear in court because they had not paid for the flete y 
averías.114 The ship, sailing from Burgos to Bruges, had stopped in a 
French port to pick up wine. That meant that an extra payment was ex-
pected from the merchants. Because the extra cargo was taken without 
the explicit approval of those merchants, they declined to pay. Subse-
quently, the master of the ship sued them before the consular court be-
cause he had also incurred extra expenses for port duties in France. The 
consuls decided that the merchants had to pay these expenses, refer-
ring to the Ordonnance of the Burgos Consulate of 1538 which stated 
that the master always had to be reimbursed for lawful expenses.115
Merchants were faced with high protection costs covered by the flete 
y averías. Among those protection costs, it included the expense of hir-
ing artillery, something that could not be insured because of a prohibi-
tion in the 1551 Ordonnance. However, merchants also ran the risk of 
paying for damages to the artillery by means of General Average after-
ward. In 1553, the Seville merchant Juan de Aguero initiated a suit at 
the consular court, arguing that only foreseeable expenses (e.g. pilotage) 
should be covered through the flete y averías, also pointing to the clear 
distinction between damages and costs.116 This left De Aguero vulnera-
ble to pay for General Average as well when the artillery would be dam-
aged during the venture. In his defence, De Aguero complained that this 
hampered his ability to trade since transaction costs could become too 
high to make a profit at all.117 The consuls, however, sentenced him to pay 
for additional mutual protection costs, such as artillery, pointing to the 
rules contained in the 1551 Ordonnance. A number of other lawsuits fol-
lowed between 1553 and 1556 by merchants unwilling to risk a double 
payment resulting from the application of the 1551 Ordonnance.118 The 
114 SAB, Libro de pleytos ordinarios, fol. 107r-v. 
115 Ibidem, fol. 107v. 
116 Ibidem, fol. 115r-v. 
117 Ibidem.
118 See for example: Ibidem, fol. 108r-v, 119r-v, 122v-124r, 145r, 151v-152r, 199r-200r, 211r-v and 
214v-215r.
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Castilian consuls however clearly jealously safeguarded the privilege of 
the flete y averías as it was used to cover for common expenses, mutual 
protection costs and foreseeable expenses, combining characteristics of 
the droit d’avarie and Contractual Average. Even if this raised transaction 
costs for individual members of the natio, the consuls pressed on with 
levying the compulsory contribution, referring to their negotiated privi-
leges which they argued benefitted the whole natio and made it impossi-
ble to opt out of the arrangement.
Conclusion
This article has argued that insurance was only one of the several tools 
of risk management in sixteenth-century Antwerp, and that General 
Average played an important role. In line with the observation by Ed-
win Hunt and Jamie Murray that revolutionary processes in business 
were often built on old structures, this article has shown how maritime 
averages developed throughout the sixteenth century to face multiple 
risks, which included sharing losses, preventing greater losses and com-
mon expenses.119 The ‘rise’ of insurance spurred legal and practical de-
velopments which clarified what risks could be shifted to a third party 
through insurance and what would continue to be paid by interested 
parties by means of mutual expenses through General Average or oth-
er forms of maritime averages. These developments added to the shift 
from uncertainty into risk on the basis of mercantile practice and ne-
cessity. No specific law governed General Average procedure through-
out the Low Countries, although general trends can be detected, such as 
the inclusion of expenses to prevent greater losses in General Average. 
By the second half of the century, Antwerp’s aldermen asserted con-
trol over General Average procedures and conflict resolution, whereas 
before merchants had used a mixture of notaries and private average 
adjusters to solve conflict, with Antwerp aldermen overseeing this sys-
tem. Structures based on solidarity survived and even thrived, account-
ing for risks for which insurance could not provide legally or practical-
ly, without the speculative risks associated with insurance itself. The 
nationes were especially instrumental in influencing the distribution 
of risk and shaping institutions to protect their own interests, echoing 
Ogilvie’s analysis of institutions as redistributive mechanisms. Irrespec-
119 Hunt and Murray, A history of business, 178-179 and 249. 
ISSN15721701.pinn.TSEG20202.indb   52 21-08-2020   10:49
DREIJER
MARITIME AVERAGES AND THE COMPLEXITY OF RISK MANAGEMENT IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ANTWERP
53
tive of any consideration of ‘efficiency’, merchants in Antwerp respond-
ed to the increasingly complex realities of commerce and the distribu-
tion of risk during the sixteenth century by refashioning the ancient 
principle of General Average as an important tool of risk management.
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